Duquesne Law Review
Volume 3

Number 1

Article 16

1964

Constitutional Law
Irwin B. Wedner

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Irwin B. Wedner, Constitutional Law, 3 Duq. L. Rev. 117 (1964).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol3/iss1/16

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

1%4]

RECENT DECISIONS

of prenatal development. "The real catalyst of the problem is the
current state of medical knowledge on the point of the separate
existence of a foetus. '' 2 2 In deciding the present case the court forgot
the "catalyst". This omission caused a distorted view of the entire
area of prenatal injury.
JOSEPH A. NICKLEACH

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Supreme Court's Equity Decree Opens Integrated Public Schools for the First Time in Prince Edward County,
Virginia.
Griffin v. County School Bd.of Prince Edward County, 84 Sup. Ct.
1226 (1964).
Does the decision in Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward
County indicate that the Supreme Court of the United States has
lost its patience? What happened in Prince Edward County, Virginia is a good example of what may result when wide latitude is
given to local authorities in solving a particular problem in the area
of education.
Petitioners began this action in 1951, alleging that Virginia laws
requiring all white public schools denied them equal protection of
the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The County
School Board of Prince Edward County, thereafter, attempted to
circumvent any relief that might be achieved by several legal maneuvers. Prince Edward County, acting pursuant to the recently amended
Virginia Constitution, 1 appropriated funds to assist students to
attend nonsectarian private schools, in addition to local or state
operated schools. The Supervisors of Prince Edward County refused
to levy school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year which resulted in
all public schools being closed since 1959. In 1960, Prince Edward's
Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance providing tuition grants of
$100, enabling children to attend nonsectarian private schools. Also,
in that year, the Board passed an ordinance allowing property tax
credits up to 25% for contributions to any non-profit nonsectarian
private school in the county. Finding that the two latter measures
had as their prime object the preservation of the separation of the
22.

Id. at 272, 164 A.2d at 95.

1. In 1956 Section 141 of the Virginia Constitution was amended to authorize the General Assembly and local governing bodies to appropriate funds to
assist students to go to public or to non-sectarian private schools in addition to
those owned by the State or by the locality.
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races in the schools of Prince Edward County, the district court in
Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 2 enjoined
Prince Edward County from paying tuition grants or giving tax
credits so long as the public schools remained closed. This same district court, subsequently, in Allen v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County,3 held that the public schools of Prince Edward
County could not be closed to avoid the effect of the law of the land
as interpreted by the Supreme Court while the Commonwealth of
Virginia permitted other public schools to remain open at the taxpayers' expense. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed this action of the district court, holding that the district
court should have awaited state court determination of the validity
of the tuition grants and the tax credits as well as the validity of
the closing of the public schools. 4 The United States Supreme Court,
granting certiorari, 5 decided thirteen years after this litigation began ". . . that . . .closing the Prince Edward County Schools while
public schools in all other counties of Virginia were being maintained,
denied the petitioners and the class of Negroes they represent, the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."6

Initially, the problem posed to the Court was whether equal protection of the laws meant that all counties had to have the same
type of educational system in order that Negro children be afforded
equal protection under the law. Was there a denial of equal protection of the laws to petitioners because all of the public schools in
every county in Virginia remained open and integrated while only
Prince Edward County's public schools were closed? In reversing
the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court answered the question in
depth, finding that there is no body of law compelling counties as
counties to be treated equally. The Court, citing Salsburg v. Maryland,7 emphasized that "the Equal Protection Clause relates to equal
protection of the laws 'between persons as such rather than between
areas'." s Because of local problems which may be financial, transportation, population or geographical, local authorities cannot al2. Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 198 F. Supp.
497 (E.D. Va. 1961).
3. Allen v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 207 F. Supp. 349,
355 (E.D. Va. 1962).
4. Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 322 F.2d
332 (4th Cir. 1963).
5. Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 375 U.S. 391,
392 (1964).
6. Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 84 Sup. Ct. 1226,
1230 (1964).
7. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
8. Id. at 551.
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ways conduct their affairs in accord with the majority of all the
other counties in a given area. But here there was no question that
a plain violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection of
the laws clause "as it relates between persons" was present, manifesting itself in the form of Prince Edward County denying colored
children the chance to go to school on an equal footing with white
children. Though the county's tuition grants extended to both white
and colored children, the end result was de facto segregation. This
was so, as enrollment in the private schools was again on the basis
of race, since the parents of the white children sent them to all white
private schools. The Court, in piercing this purported veil of equality,
did exactly what it saw fit to do in Brown v. Board of Education,9
when it held separate facilities though of equal quality were unequal
before the law. The Court here, in stating, "whatever nonracial
grounds might support a State's allowing a county to abandon public
schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race
and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional"' 0 ,
again emphasized that separate but equal is inherently unequal and
separate but equal private facilities with public overtones are just
as inherently unequal. The public overtones, of course, took the
shape of racially segregated schools which, although designated as
private, were actual beneficiaries of county and state support.
With the Court reinforcing the right of Negro children to attend
non-segregated schools as laid down in the case of Brown v. Board
of Education, the problem then centered around the all-important
question of what remedies would be invoked to enforce this protected right. When the case at bar was previously heard before the
Supreme Court in 1955 with several cases of similar import on the
nature of relief to be afforded the wronged parties, 1 the Court, in
remanding those cases to the respective district courts, called for
"....

such orders ... as are necessary and proper to admit (com-

plainants) to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis
with all deliberate speed ....,"12 There the Court was making use
of one of the most effective weapons in the hands of the judiciarythe equity decree. The Court desired that the respective defendants
make conscious efforts to remedy their peculiar situations, the
Court taking into consideration the fact that local pressures would
impede, somewhat, the progress intended by the Brown edict. But the
equity decree did not gain the proper response from Prince Edward
County as what the county's school board did with "all deliberate
9. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Supra note 6 at 1233.
11. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
12.

Id. at 301.
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speed" was to affirmatively prevent the admittance of petitioners to
public schools in that county on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.
The district court, recognizing the unwarranted delay, saw fit to
enjoin the county officials from paying county tuition grants or giving
tax exemptions and from processing applications for state tuition
grants so long as the county's public schools remained closed.' 3 The
Supreme Court was in agreement with this remedy and cast wide
latitude upon the district court in remanding the case to that court
when it proclaimed that:
• . . the District Court, may if necessary to prevent further

racial discrimination, require the Supervisors to exercise the
power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to.
reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination
a public school system in Prince Edward County like that
t4
operated in other counties in Virginia.
The Supreme Court has undoubtedly lost its patience since its decision in the Brown1 5 case and now declares, "the time for mere
'deliberate speed' has run out .....

"

16, and rightly so.

This decree is not really so drastic if it is squared against the
wrong which has been corrected. 17 The delaying tactics of the
Prince Edward County School Board were able to operate in the
"necessary and proper boundaries" of the 1955 Brown decision because of the lack of a definite, detailed decree with specific directions.
But the Court in that decision could not be too definitive because of
the nature of the local problems peculiar to each political body that
was named as a defendant in that case. However, after ten years
of patient observation, with nothing but complete opposition to its
decree in Prince Edward County, the Supreme Court could only do
in all good conscience, what was required of it as the final arbiter of
the law. Because it is our heritage to be a government of laws and
not of men, the Supreme Court could not allow the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment to be denied legal effect. While
exhibiting the utmost restraint ten years after the Brown decision,
the Supreme Court, in invoking the Equal Protection Clause to meet
the test for which it was established, has revitalized this principle,
making it a reality in Prince Edward County.
IRWIN B. WEDNER
13. Supra note 2 at 504.
14. Supra note 6 at 1234.
15. Supra at note 11.
16. Supra note 6 at 1235.
17. On September 8, 1964, public education returned to Prince Edward
County, ending a five year attempt to preserve classroom segregation by locking
the school doors.

